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THE POLISH ETHNO-POLITICAL COMPONENT OF THE UPR/WUPR STATEHOOD FORMATION (1918 – 1939)

During the Russian and Ukrainian revolutions, pre-war Polish and Ukrainian national ideas underwent certain ideological and organizational changes. The dynamics of ethno-political transformations in Ukraine and Poland during 1918 called into question certain optimism about the future progress of Ukrainian-Polish interstate relations that had prevailed in the previous year. Politicians from both sides began to realize the mutual conflict between the two state-political projects, which were implemented on the ruins of the Russian Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Ukrainian diplomacy in 1917–1918 was mainly focused on maintaining trusting relations with the Central Powers, with the help of which the Ukrainian People's Republic and the State of Ukraine sought to resolve territorial issues disputed with their neighbors, in particular, to determine the status/belonging of Eastern Galicia, Northern Bukovyna, Transcarpathia, Volhynia, and Kholm region. However, after the victory in the World War, the main role in the formation of the foreign policy of the Entente was played by France, whose opinion was decisive at the Paris Peace Conference, at which the fate of the "old" and new countries in post-war Europe, including the Soviet Ukrainian People's Republic, was decided. Not understanding the ambitious plans of Ukrainian politicians, Paris did not want to conduct an official dialogue with the diplomats of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the People's Republic of Ukraine, since an independent Ukrainian state, particularly in the post-imperial space of Russia, did not fit into the geopolitics of the victorious countries in Eastern Europe.

Keywords: Polish-Ukrainian relations, diplomacy, the Second Polish Commonwealth, interwar period, UPR, WUPR.

ПОЛЬСЬКА ЕТНОПОЛІТИЧНА СКЛАДОВА ДЕРЖАВОТВОРЕННЯ УНР/ЗУНР (1918 – 1939 РР.)

У ході Російської та Української революцій польська та українська довоєнні національні ідеї зазнали певних ідеологічних та організаційних змін. Динаміка етнополітичних трансформацій в Україні та Польщі протягом 1918 р. поставила під сумнів домінуючий у попередньому році певний оптимізм щодо майбутнього поступу українсько-польських міждержавних відносин. Політичні діячі з обох сторін почали усвідомлювати взаємну конфліктність двох державно-політичних проєктів, які реалізовувалися на уламках Російської імперії та Австро-Угорської монархії. Українська дипломатія в 1917–1918 рр. зосереджувалася переважно у напрямку підтримки довірливих відносин із Центральними державами, за допомогою яких УНР і Українська держава прагнули вирішити спірні з сусідами територіальні питання, зокрема визначити статус/приналежність Східної Галичини, Північної Буковини, Закарпаття, Волині, Холмщини. Однак, після перемоги у світовій війні основну роль у формуванні зовнішньої політики Антанти відіграла Франція, чия думка була вирішальною на Паризькій мирній конференції, на якій вирішувалася доля «старих» і нових країн у післявоєнній Європі, в тому числі й соборної УНР. Не зрозумівши амбітні плани українських політиків, Париж не бажав вести офіційний діалог із дипломатами УНР і ЗУНР, оскільки незалежна Українська держава, зокрема на постімперському просторі Росії, не вписувалася в геополітику країн-переможниць на Сході Європи.

Ключові слова: польсько-українські відносини, дипломатія, Друга Річ Посполита, міжвоєнний період, УНР, ЗУНР.

With the beginning of the Ukrainian national-democratic revolution, the development of international politics and the establishment of interstate relations became one of the most important tasks of the new government. During the first stages of formation of the Ukrainian statehood – the era of the Ukrainian Central Council, the Hetmanate of P. Skoropadskyi, the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the West Ukrainian People's Republic in 1917-1923, their experience was accumulated in the formation of authorities and administration with the participation of national minorities, coalition governments, diplomatic embassies, representative offices and missions, in general, the creation of a civil society, a tolerant ethno-political space of the state, that can be valuable for the modern stage of Ukrainian ethno-state formation.

The leadership of the Central Rada was forced to deal with the challenges of foreign policy almost from the beginning of its existence, while not having a special department. The process of foreign policy and national diplomacy formation can be divided into three stages. Each of them is characterized by a different priority of relations with the leading international powers of that time [13]:

- Russia, that was increasingly immersed in revolution and civil conflict, seeking to keep Ukrainian and Polish territories in its orbit;
- Countries of the Entente, that made great efforts to win the First World War, to revive a sovereign Poland from the fragments of empires, that had to oppose the new Russian expansion into Europe;
- Germany and its allied countries, that tried to end hostilities on the Eastern Front and thus weaken their opponents, while using the resources of Ukraine.

The main prerequisite for the formation of new interstate relations and the diplomatic service of the Ukrainian Central Rada was the appearance of the General Secretariat of International Affairs, which was initially headed by S. Yefremov, and from July 25, 1917, by O. Shulgin, as part of the government of the autonomous Ukrainian People's Republic. Its important task was the solution of interethnic challenges. On the basis of this secretariat, the formation of the first national foreign policy structure began, in particular, on December 26, 1917, the creation of the General Secretariat of International Affairs, headed by A. Shulgin, was announced [12].

In the fall of 1917, Kyiv became the center of contacts and revival of negotiations with representatives of the Entente, primarily France and England. Undoubtedly, the interest of the Entente in Ukraine increased significantly, which was mainly due to their fear of the cessation of hostilities on the Eastern Front and the redeployment of German and Austro-Hungarian divisions to the west. Aware of the importance of relations with multi-ethnic Ukraine, Entente military experts tried to convince Paris of the expediency and perspective of financial and material support of the Ukrainian People's Republic (in exchange for Ukraine's continuation of the war). At the end of November and the

beginning of December 1917, the French missions in Iasi, Petrograd, and Paris tried to decide what their next steps would be in relation to anti-Bolshevik Ukraine. The French government was extremely cautious in matters of Ukraine's independence and was restrained in its policy of self-reliance. In general, the orientation of the UPR's foreign policy towards the Entente was shaky, but stable. At the end of 1917, Ukrainian statehood found itself in a hopeless situation due to the lack of regular armed forces to protect against the Bolshevik offensive, therefore, on December 24, the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic demanded from the Soviet People's Commissar of Russia an urgent withdrawal of troops from Ukraine, and sent a note to the warring parties of the Central Powers and the Entente about the intention to participate in Brest Peace Conference (Russia offered to hold it in Stockholm) [31, pp. 318–322; 32, p. 67].

When deciding to participate in the negotiations, the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic took national interests into account and expected to conclude a "democratic peace" with the Central Powers and stop the Bolshevik offensive because the Russian delegation also participated in the conference. Along with this, Kyiv considered it necessary to strengthen relations with the Entente countries. Many influential figures supported the orientation towards the Entente, first of all A. Shulgin, S. Petliura, as well as M. Hrushevskyi, who never showed pro-German sentiments or opinions, which he repeatedly stated. In general, the evolution of the policy of the Central Rada from the desire to obtain the autonomy of Ukraine within Russia to the creation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and later the declaration of its full sovereignty, led to the restoration of independent international activity of Ukraine, that was lost during the period of statelessness. During the period of the Ukrainian Central Rada, certain major directions for the further development of the diplomatic service of the Ukrainian national-democratic statehood for 1917–1923 were outlined. The experience of the first echelon was used in the development of the international relations department of the Hetmanate of P. Skoropadskyi, and later for the diplomacy of the Directorates of the UPR, WUPR [13].

The main direction and primary task that the ministry of O. Shulgin set before itself was the withdrawal of Ukraine from the world war. The statesmen understood that there was no need for Ukraine to continue participating in the war against the Central Powers, as the Provisional Government demanded at the negotiations in Kyiv. On the contrary, Ukraine should use all freed resources for national state-building, for which it was necessary to achieve immediate peace. When on December 2, 1917, the Bolshevik delegation led by A. Joffe and L. Kamenev concluded an armistice agreement with the German command and began negotiations in the Brest Fortress on signing a peace treaty with the Central Powers, the General Secretariat adopted the text of an appeal to all belligerents and of neutral states, in which he declared: Ukraine chooses the direction of its own foreign policy and international relations. The leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic considered "starting active work in the cause of peace" as the main direction of diplomatic activity and encourages all hostile parties to start peace negotiations [16].

German diplomats warmly welcomed the Ukrainian mission in Brest, hoping to use its anti-Bolshevik sentiments to put pressure on the delegation of the Soviet People's Committee. When on January 1, 1918, during the recess of the conference, R. von Kuhlmann spoke before the deputies of the Reichstag, he confidently declared that he would hold negotiations in Brest not only with Russia, but also with the "autonomous communities" and, above all, with the largest and most important – the Ukrainian state [18; 31, pp. 323–324].

The difficult military-political and internal situation of Germany and Russia required them to take immediate action, so their governments tried to start negotiations and peacemaking as soon as possible. The German command believed that the redeployment of troops from the Eastern Front to the Western Front could decide the fate of the war. The status of the Soviet People's Committee during the period of peace negotiations in Brest and its international legal status were not recognized not only by the countries of the Entente and the Central Bloc, but also by state entities on the

territory of the former Russian Empire. In this regard, the Ukrainian delegation chose the independent development of relations with the Central countries as the main direction of its diplomatic activity.

During the negotiations, the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic tried to create a legal basis for Ukrainian statehood to be considered in the international arena as an equal ethno-political entity. The Russian delegation tried to prevent the participation of the UPR delegation in the conference, and when its representatives arrived, demanded that they be subordinated to Russia. However, the Ukrainian delegation managed to preserve the right of Ukraine to act independently as a subject of international relations, albeit with some assistance from the heads of the diplomatic missions of Germany and Austria-Hungary, who benefited from the weakening of Russia's position through partnership with independent Ukraine. The fact that these countries were interested in Ukraine became clear after the backstage meeting of their representatives with the UPR delegation before the opening of the plenary sessions of the conference, namely on January 6, where the Ukrainians were informed about Chancellor H. Hertling's favorable attitude to establishing close contacts with Ukraine [13].

The Austro-Hungarian delegation behaved somewhat restrained towards the Ukrainian People's Republic, recognizing it only for a role in the cessation of hostilities in the East. In the end, F. Rosenberg unofficially informed the Ukrainian delegation about Germany's readiness to meet the demands set out in the appeal, in particular, about the recognition of the delegation from Ukraine. The German delegation openly pushed the leadership of the Ukrainian Central Council to take decisive action – the declaration of Ukraine's independence. The success of the Ukrainian diplomatic delegation at the negotiations in Brest regarding the recognition of the Ukrainian People's Republic as an independent subject of international politics required decisive action. Therefore, on January 22 (9), 1918, the Ukrainian Central Rada adopted the IV Universal, which proclaimed the "independence" of the Ukrainian People's Republic, and also announced that it wants to live in harmony and friendship with all "neighboring states, in particular

Russia and Poland, and establish the desired peace" [32, pp. 102–104]. Later, M. Hrushevskyi admitted that this historical act was based on foreign policy factors, such as the recognition by the Central Powers of the state-legal status of Ukraine, and its diplomatic delegation as an independent subject at the Brest peace negotiations. However, new obstacles arose on this path. One of them can be considered the appearance on January 30, 1918, after a break in the conference, of a delegation from the Bolshevik government of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine proclaimed in Kharkov, which L. Trotsky summoned to Brest as a means and ally in the confrontation with the diplomatic mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic. It should be noted that during the work of the peace conference, two Ukrainian delegations tried to establish contacts in the person of Yu. Medvedev and M. Lyubynskyi, who held long but fruitless conversations. Ukrainian diplomats showed great abilities and skills in using the contradictions that existed between Bolshevik Russia and the Central Powers, as well as the shaky internal position of Germany and Austria-Hungary [12]. They established friendly relations with members of the Austro-Hungarian delegation, who shared secret information with the UPR delegation.

The signing of the peace in Brest caused a wave of protests in Polish lands, as a result the Polish Auxiliary Corps of the Austro-Hungarian Army left the front [14]. Demonstrations were held demanding the the fight against "German-Austrian-Ukrainian occupation" and the impossibility of "neighborly relations of the Polish state with Ukraine" [2]. The leaders of the Kingdom of Poland were more restrained: on February 19, 1918, Prime Minister J. Kucharzewski in a statement to the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic expressed the wish that "good neighborly relations will be established between Poland and Ukraine", emphasized the need for bilateral negotiations regarding the Ukrainian-Polish border and noted: Warsaw does not recognize any treaty that was concluded without its participation [1]. However, his statement did not prompt Kyiv to immediately establish bilateral diplomatic relations, as de facto the fate of Kholm region and Podlasie remained uncertain.

The efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy were mainly directed to support the alliance relations with the Central Powers, the agreements with which were based on the attempts of both Ukrainians and Poles to resolve disputed territorial issues. In addition, due to the diplomatic pressure of the Polish politicians on Vienna, the government of Austria-Hungary was also in no hurry to ratify the Treaty of Brest. In the end, Austria-Hungary became the only state of the Fourth Alliance that did not ratify this treaty. Soon, under pressure from the Poles, Vienna refused to fulfill the conditions of the secret annex (on the separation of Eastern and Western Galicia by July 20, 1918), and the document itself was burned [17, pp. 308-309; 22, pp. 181-185; 34].

But, despite the difference in views, Polish diplomats also tried to establish diplomatic relations with the Ukrainian state. In a report dated June 1, 1918, the director of the State Department proved the need to create a department in Kyiv "with the permission of the Central Powers, or without such permission" on the condition that Poland renounces territorial claims to Volhynia and does not recognize the Treaty of Brest [7]. As early as October 1918, Ambassador S. Vankovich and military attache Y. Kleeberg arrived in Kyiv. The former, during a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian State, D. Doroshenko, declared Poland's desire to determine the borders between the two states without the intervention of Austria-Hungary and Germany. On November 7, 1918, the Polish ambassador met with P. Skoropadsky, with whom it was agreed to resolve any issues through negotiations [5]. On October 19, the Ukrainian state decided to establish an embassy in Poland. However, the law of November 6, 1918 initially provided for the opening of the Consulate General of the Ukrainian State in Warsaw and the Vice-Consulate in Łódź [35]. However, O. Karpinski, who was appointed ambassador to Poland, did not arrive at the place due to the beginning of the anti-Hetman uprising. On November 5, it was planned to open an extraordinary diplomatic mission in Lviv, the capital of WUPR [29, pp. 344-345].

The Ukrainian People's Republic of the Directorate period was also in a difficult geopolitical situation: it fought with Bolshevik Russia and its puppet formation on the

territory of Ukraine, in the fall of 1919 - with the Denikin Volunteer Army, for some time it was in a fierce confrontation with the Polish army on the Kholm-Volyn Front, felt mistrust from the Entente countries. Therefore, in statements and declarations, the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Republic constantly emphasized that the young republic aspires to establish peace and friendly relations with all countries, and wishes to establish diplomatic and economic ties with them. Instead, the Entente countries and the United States, whose relations with the Hetmanate were promising and were cut off by the rebellion of the Directorate, considered the UPR and its army unsuitable for use in the fight against the Red Army. They knew that there was no unity and understanding among the politicians and leaders of the UPR and WUPR in choosing a foreign policy geostrategy [10, pp. 27-83; 21, pp. 119-229].

After the victory in the World War I, France took the leading role in shaping the foreign policy of the allied states, whose opinion was decisive in determining the fate of European countries, including Ukraine, during the Paris Peace Conference. Paris did not want to develop relations with the UPR Directorate and did not respond to attempts by Ukrainian diplomacy to establish contact, as it believed that an independent Ukrainian state did not fit into the anti-Bolshevik plans of the victorious countries [26].

The vector of foreign policy chosen by the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic in the direction of the Entente turned into attempts to build relations with France, but it did not meet the expectations of the Ukrainian authorities. Among the main reasons for this situation, it should be noted the political course of the allies, who did not recognize Ukraine as an independent state and whose main task was to strengthen Poland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic inherited a wide network of foreign diplomatic missions from the Hetmanate. However, despite the financial difficulties, the apparatus of international relations preserved the previous structural organization and a large number of diplomats, in addition, the Department of Foreign Relations made a lot of efforts to strengthen the diplomatic presence in the world. Unfortunately, only at the end of the Directorate's existence was a

project prepared that would allow for the reorganization of the Department of Foreign Relations, according to which the diplomatic department was divided into 5 territorial units: Slavic peoples, Central Powers, Anglo-Saxon peoples, Middle Eastern peoples, Romani peoples. It should be noted that during the development of foreign diplomatic missions of Ukraine during the Directorate period, a large number of them had the character of temporary emergency diplomatic missions because the world community did not recognize Ukraine as an independent subject of international relations, with the exception of the Central Powers, which had Ukrainian embassies.

From the beginning of its existence, the relations of the Ukrainian People's Republic with the government of V. Lenin in Russia and the Bolshevik government of H. Rakovsky in Ukraine were characterized by hostility and armed conflicts. However, on February 5, 1919, the Bolshevik government turned to S. Petliura with the intention of signing a peace agreement on the following terms [13]:

1. The Directorate recognizes Soviet power in Ukraine;
2. Ukraine's active participation in hostilities against the Entente, the armies of Denikin and Krasnov, Poland;
3. Joint struggle against the counter-revolution.

But S. Petliura rejected this proposal, as it would mean renunciation of independence and capitulation of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the collapse of its foreign relations.

Both diplomatic vectors of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic - the eastern one towards Bolshevik Russia and the western one - towards the Entente did not justify themselves, and its leaders came to the conclusion that it was futile to hope for an understanding with the powerful states of the East and West, as they were in no hurry to recognize the right of the Ukrainian people to the statehood and sovereignty of the lands. In the second half of 1919, the system of foreign policy guidelines changed again. The Ukrainian People's Republic was forced to approach Poland, which became its only ally in a catastrophic situation in December 1919 and sheltered the government and the army

to continue the struggle against Bolshevik Russia. The restoration of the Ukrainian National People's Republic under the leadership of the Directorate almost coincided with the formation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. The formation of an independent western state was welcomed in Dnieper Ukraine, and the armed resistance of Galician Ukrainians against Poland caused a wave of support and calls to help Ukrainians "beyond Zbruch."

In the matter of diplomatic support for the WUPR, the Dnieper diplomats under the leadership of G. Sydorenko made the greatest contribution during the Paris Peace Conference. The UPR and WUPR delegations arrived in Paris without an official invitation, as they were not recognized as participants in the conference, however, due to the fact that the issue of Eastern Galicia was raised, representatives of the UPR were given the opportunity to participate in discussions with the participation of the heads of great powers and speak out in defense of the independence of the WUPR and first above all with the demands of ending the Polish-Ukrainian war.

After the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic lost Kyiv, its members tried to redefine the foreign policy vector: left-wing politicians proposed to negotiate with the Bolsheviks and start hostilities against the Entente and Poland, while the socialist-federalists, on the contrary, advocated an alliance with the Entente and Poland and armed action against the Bolsheviks [4]. As a result of the analysis of all options, on December 19, 1918, the Ukrainian People's Republic decided to fight on two fronts - against Poland in the west and against Bolshevik Russia in the east. This decision was significantly influenced by the situation in the west of Ukraine, where the WUPR opposed Poland in the struggle for Lviv from November 1, 1918 [23]. At that time, the Ukrainian People's Republic was only planning the advance of its army in the Volyn-Kholm direction and the organization of assistance to the Galician army [28].

Meanwhile, Poland, which gained independence in November 1918, was not convinced of the need to develop relations with Ukraine. Warsaw was in no hurry to make any decision regarding the Ukrainian People's Republic due to, according to the political

report of December 21, 1918, the "the imminent occupation of Ukraine by the Allies - with larger or smaller forces" [4]. Accordingly, this gave the Directorate time to decide on its foreign policy vector. At that time, there was a representative office of Poland in Kyiv headed by adviser B. Kutylovsky and military attache H. Ostapovich [6].

During November 1918, Poland gradually freed itself from the Austro-German occupation. Starting from November 2, Polish troops occupied Kholm, and on November 22 - Volodymyr Volynskyi [9].

At the beginning of January 1919, the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic decided to clarify the ground for possible diplomatic relations and sent an extraordinary mission to Warsaw headed by V. Prokopovich. As a result, one of the representatives of the Ukrainian delegation, Y. Voloshynovskyi, held an informal meeting with J. Pilsudsky, after which V. Prokopovych sent a telegram to Kyiv with information about the positive attitude of official Warsaw towards an understanding with Kyiv. However, the telegram was not received in Kyiv, so the diplomatic mission returned without results [33].

On January 22, the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic occupied Volodymyr-Volynskyi, which created a new obstacle on the path of understanding between Ukraine and Poland. In addition, on this day, the Act of Unification was signed, announcing the unification of the UPR and the WUPR, and therefore official Kyiv began to make plans for a military confrontation with the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, the plans of the Ukrainian People's Republic were thwarted by the Red Army, which broke into the territory of Right-Bank Ukraine, so the Polish troops returned Volodymyr-Volynskyi on January 24, and later continued the counteroffensive and captured Kovel and Torchyn [23].

It should be noted that the fighting in Volyn was of a limited nature, since the Polish Army considered the Galician front to be the main direction of military operations, and the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic considered the Bolshevik front. In addition, J. Pilsudsky saw Ukraine as an independent state - an ally of the

Commonwealth, so he was in no hurry to wage a full-scale war with the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic to eliminate Ukrainian statehood (as he planned in Eastern Galicia), but only tried to create a border beneficial for the Second Commonwealth and to force S. Petliura to refuse the union with WUPR. The delegate from the Paris Conference, General J. Barthelemy, who came to Lviv to reconcile Poles and Ukrainians, was amazed that Poland does not consider the Ukrainian front as a whole, but has different intentions regarding the Galician and Volyn areas of the front [4].

The new Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian People's Republic, K. Matsievich, understood that it was possible to receive armed assistance from the Entente states to fight against the Bolsheviks only after reaching an understanding with Poland [4], so at the beginning of April 1919, he sent his authorized representative B. Kurdynovsky to Warsaw [8]. And already in May, J. Pilsudsky sent his representative J. Mazurkevych to S. Petliura.

In the end, J. Pilsudsky and S. Petliura took the opportunity to end the confrontation, and in 1920 in Warsaw they signed a mutual agreement, although it is worth noting that this union was short-lived and fell apart under the influence of various foreign political factors. Due to the negative attitude of the Entente towards Ukraine during the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919, in which the Ukrainian People's Republic supported the Western Ukrainian People's Republic and the Entente supported Poland [26], the treaty was concluded with great delay.

Later, S. Petliura noted that the treaty concluded between the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ukrainian People's Republic on April 21, 1920, was annulled by the fact that the treaty between Moscow and Poland was signed in Riga, and thus Warsaw nullified the Ukrainian factor in its eastern policy.

Therefore, the treaty signed in Riga, which marked the end of the Polish-Soviet war, became a devastating factor for Ukraine in the national liberation struggle. Before the Treaty of Riga, the Commonwealth was interested in the presence of Ukrainian troops on its territory, because it controlled the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic

and could count on its support against Moscow, but after the Polish-Soviet treaty, the need to support the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic disappeared. Therefore, in 1922–1923, it was decided to close the expanded internment camps for Ukrainian soldiers (Aleksandriv Kuyavskiy, Stshalkovo, Tsypiorno, Kalish, Lantsut, Pikulich, Tuholya), that housed approx. 25 thousand people. At that time, many spontaneous Ukrainian military cemeteries or fields appeared around the camps [20, pp. 3-17]. Most of them are currently in need of restoration.

At the same time, thanks to the Warsaw Pact, with the help of the Second Commonwealth, the people of Ukraine continued the struggle for independence against the Bolsheviks and, together with the Polish Army, prevented the Red Army from exporting the Bolshevik revolution to Western Europe. The united Ukrainian-Polish army stopped the First Cavalry Army, the XII and XIV Armies in August 1920 in Eastern Galicia, in particular near Lviv and Zamosti. The defense of the Zamostyan fortress and the city was heroically led by the commander of the 6th Rifle Division of the UPR Army, Colonel M. Bezruchko. In 1944, the military minister of the UPR government-in-exile was buried at the Orthodox cemetery in Warsaw (Wola Cemetery). In 2020, in connection with the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Ukrainian-Polish military-political union, parks in Warsaw, Gdańsk, Koszalin, Wrocław were named in honor of M. Bezruchko [3; 20, pp. 98-99; 30, pp. 88-93].

Regarding the foreign policy of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, it should be noted that from the first days of the creation of the state, the President of the UP Rada Ye. Petrushevich and the State Secretariat tried to solve two main foreign policy problems: first, to organize resistance to Poland in the international arena and to prove to the world, primarily to the states - winners of the war, the legitimacy and legality of their steps aimed at creating their own state; secondly, to find military and logistical assistance, allies in the fight against the aggressors - Poland, Romania, Hungary.

The young Galician diplomacy was in international isolation, which it found very difficult to overcome. The conduct of foreign policy, the formation of its priorities and

the opening of diplomatic missions in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, missions in Italy, the Vatican, Brazil, the USA, and Canada were complicated by the war between Poland and Ukraine, in which Warsaw had a reliable ally - the Entente, which tried to create a strong Second Commonwealth to oppose Bolshevik Russia and Germany. In this regard, diplomatic functions were often performed by representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora in the USA and Canada, as well as Metropolitan A. Sheptytskyi of the GCC, who in the early 1920s made a number of international trips, during which he met with well-known foreign state, public and political figures. There were also authorized delegations at conferences in Paris (1919), Riga (1920), Geneva (1920), and Genoa (1920). Finally, on July 25, 1920, by order of Ye. Petrushevich, the foreign government of the WUPR was created, which in its foreign policy doctrines condemned the decisions of the Supreme Council regarding the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia, advocated the restoration of the sovereignty of the WUPR/Galician state, which were to become the centers of the revival of statehood of Ukraine [11, pp. 10-18; 24; 36]. Orientation towards the Entente, which had many supporters among the leaders of the WUPR, required considerable diplomatic efforts and was unsuccessful, since the main role in the formation of the foreign policy of the Entente and the USA in relation to the WUPR was played by France, which during the World War turned into an advocate of Polish foreign policy. The formation of a strong Polish state was one of the main directions of French foreign policy led by G. Clemenceau. He constantly repeated that Galician Ukrainians fought on the side of Austria-Hungary against the Entente, the Ukrainian People's Republic concluded the Peace of Brest, that is, an alliance with Germany, and therefore imposed his negative position on the heads of Great Britain, the United States, etc. Instead, WUPR diplomats tried to draw attention to the problems of their state [19], but their attempts did not find a positive reaction from the Entente countries and the USA [27, pp. 40-118].

The foreign policy of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic was somewhat different, which sought to change the attitude of the Entente and the USA, as

well as to get as close as possible to Poland and Romania [27, pp. 72-73]. Attempts were also made to coordinate foreign policy actions with the leadership of WUPR. Actually, after the announcement of the unification with Greater Ukraine, there was an urgent need to agree and coordinate the foreign policy of the states and foreign affairs departments of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. For this purpose, an extended meeting was held with the participation of representatives of the governments and diplomatic services of the UPR and WUPR, at which an agreement was reached on the unification, first of all, of foreign diplomatic institutions into all-Ukrainian [15]. All foreign institutions of the Ukrainian People's Republic received instructions to cooperate with Galician diplomats and assist them in their activities [12]. The main principles of mutual diplomatic cooperation were declared in the general protocol of March 30, 1919 of the foreign policy departments of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Cooperation began with joint actions at the Paris Peace Conference, at which the challenges of the post-war system of Europe, in particular its east, were resolved.

Ultimately, thanks to the activities of Ukrainian representatives in Paris, the Eastern problem was brought to a high international level, where the stereotypes created by the Poles about the Ukrainian people were refuted [12]. The Entente states in Paris had an unequivocally negative attitude to the formation of independent states, in particular Ukrainian, on the former territory of Russia. Unfortunately, the Eastern question (actually Polish or Russian) was the only matter in which the participants of the Paris Conference officially entered into a diplomatic dialogue with the Ukrainian delegation.

In addition to the Paris conference, the Galician problem was also discussed at other international forums. Thanks to the deployment of Ukrainian missions, appeals and memoranda to the countries of the Entente, the League of Nations and international forums regarding the restoration of the independence of the Galician Republic, Ukrainian diplomats constantly drew the world's attention to the Eastern Galician and all-Ukrainian challenges.

On November 28, 1920, a diplomatic delegation led by Ye. Petrushevich was sent to Geneva for the League of Nations conference. After meetings with the diplomats of the leading states, they submitted an appeal to the League of Nations, in which they insisted on recognizing Eastern Galicia as an independent state on its ethnic territory and giving the UP Council the opportunity to represent the interests of the Galician population in the League of Nations. During April-May 1922, the problem of the lands of Eastern Galicia occupied by the Second Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was discussed at the Genoa Conference, but to no avail. On March 14, 1923, the Council of Ambassadors of the Entente countries determined the new borders of Poland in the East with the condition of granting autonomy to Eastern Galicia, which was never implemented. After the announcement of the protest statement, the WUPR government in exile effectively ceased to exist [25, pp. 343-368; 31, pp. 362-377].

In general, the foreign policy activity of the WUPR in emigration was active and large-scale, had national-state orientations and was consistent in achieving its goal - restoring the independence of the WUPR, and later the whole of Ukraine. However, failures on the diplomatic front were the result of objective geopolitical factors, which were formed by powerful states (primarily the Entente countries), which were not interested in the existence of independent UPR and WUPR. Analyzing the gains and losses of the All-Ukrainian diplomatic service as a whole, it should be noted that the integration of the diplomatic departments of both states took place hastily, and many legal and political issues remained unsettled and uncoordinated.

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